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ABSTRACT
The objective of establishing legal order sui generis that on the EU level will, due 
to its fl exibility and differentiation, be able to effectively respond to dynamic move-
ments of internal market as well as to globalization challenges in general, in the last 
two decades lead to extensive transformations of the EU legal order. One of them is 
growing importance of soft law instruments and subsequent differenti ation of legal 
regulation – to traditional regulation new modes of regulation have been added (as 
a result of so called “new legislative culture”). Although at fi rst when adopting the 
decision, the Court of the European Union denied the recognition of existence and 
function of soft law, later the Court gradually adapted to differentiating trend in the 
EU legal order and is thus nowadays recognizing the normative value of soft law in 
the EU. When deriving the decision the Court is considering soft law as part of legal 
framework (in this case soft law is used as a ground for interpretation of hard law 
provision or as an instrument of confi rmation of interpretation of binding law) or it 
recognizes self-binding and binding effect of soft law (in this case soft instrument is a 
substantive rule on which the decision is grounded). With such approach, to soft law 
normative status is conferred; the latter – despite it being on the non-binding side – 
is therefore having indirect legal effect and is creating indirect legal consequences.
*  PhD candidate at Faculty of Law University of Maribor
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1.  INTRODUCTION
In the European Union (hereinafter: EU) soft law is all but unknown fi gure, 
because the EU has long before relied on instruments legal status of which 
was not completely clear or unequivocal or which were not legally binding 
per se. However what indeed is new is the trend of encouraging use of soft 
law and consequent exponent increase of this type of instruments on the EU 
level. The latter appeared at the break of the Millennium, when critics of the 
EU legislation began to demand better and less legislation (i.e. more in quali-
ty, less in quantity) and better governance. The respond to the debate was the 
introduction of “new legislative culture” with slogan: “do less, in order to do 
better” by the European Commission in White paper on European Governan-
ce in 2001.1 Approximately at the same time EU institutions have begun to 
acknowledge soft law instruments as possible alternatives to binding legislati-
on. Notices, White and Green Papers, Resolutions, Declarations, Action Plans, 
Rules of Conduct and Practice and other soft law acts appeared afterwards. 
Despite such consequent transformation of the EU legal order, Article 288 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereinafter: TFEU) as basic provisi-
on defi ning EU legal acts, with exception of opinions and recommendations, 
today still does not mention other types of soft law at all. Reality of EU legal 
acts is hence at the non-binding level much more diverse as Article 288 TFEU 
suggests.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOFT LAW IN THE EU
The core idea behind today’s extensive use of soft law is that soft law will, be-
cause of its fl exibility and differentiation, lead to greater effi ciency, fl exibility, 
legitimacy and transparency of the EU legal order. Whether this is actually 
the case remains questionable. Namely soft law is also subject of numerous 
polemics and doubts, starting even with the European Parliament which in the 
Resolution from 2007 expressed the view that “the notion of soft law, based 
on common practice, is ambiguous and pernicious and should not be used in 
any documents of the Community institutions” and  that “soft law all too often 
constitutes an ambiguous and ineffective instrument which is liable to have 
a detrimental effect on Community legislation and institutional balance”,2 
therefore EU institutions shall refrain from its use or at least limit it to the 
minimum extent. 
1  European Governance, White Paper COM (2001) 428 fi nal, Brussels, 25. 7. 2001. 
2  European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implica-
tions of the use of “soft law” instruments (2007/2028(INI)), statement A and AA 1. 
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Although in legal theory there is no uniform defi nition of soft law (many aut-
hors build their defi nitions from defi nitions of soft law at the international level 
where soft law is widespread and actually represents “natural” phenomenon), 
academics generally agree that undisputable and fundamental characteristic 
of soft law is, as the name already suggests, its non-binding nature: these acts 
are not legally binding and enforceable as this is the case for regulations or 
directives. The logical consequence of the latter is (inter alia) general absence 
of legal sanctions in strict sense. Such softness of instruments in comparison 
to hard law has caused two lines of understanding of nature of soft law in legal 
writing. These are: theory of binary view (relative normativity) and theory of 
continuum view (graduated normativity). Both deal with the question whet-
her soft law shall be acknowledged status of law or not. In short, underlying 
assumption of theory of binary view is that the essence of law is its normativity 
or bindingness. The characteristic is not a matter of degree: either the rule is 
legally binding or it is not. In the fi rst case it is law, in the second case it is 
politics or morality. Because there is no third possible option, for this theory 
soft law is logically impossible and contradictio in terminis. Because it sells 
something as law, which in fact it is not, the term soft law from this point of 
view is also misleading, therefore its use shall be abandoned.3 Contrary to this, 
the theory of graduated normativity recognizes that law may have various di-
fferent legal effects and consequences, which may be direct or indirect, weaker 
or stronger, harder and softer. Graduated normativity therefore means that law 
can be more or less binding or more or less non-binding (harder or softer) and 
that between binding law, soft law and other possible qualities of law continuo-
us connection is given.4 For this view, despite its non-binding nature, soft law 
can therefore have normative value. As normative intensity is graduated and 
should be understood fl owingly, the normative value can vary in dependence 
from type of an instrument and circumstances of its adoption. The denial of 
soft law for this theory represents closing eyes to the reality, that rules which 
in full do not fulfi ll criteria expected for recognized sources of law exist and 
play more and more important role in international and EU practice and which 
3  Mörth, U., Soft Regulation and global democracy in Sahlin-Andersson, K., Djelic, M.-L. 
(ed.); Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2006, pp. 119-135, p. 120; Weil P., Towards Relative Normativity in Inter-
national Law, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, No. 3, July 1983, pp. 413-
442, p. 435; Luhmann N, Das Recht der Gessellschaft (suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft), 
Frankfurt am Main 1984, pp. 57-70.
4  Reisman, W. M., The Conceptions and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics 
v Bello E. G., Bola P. A.A. (eds.), Essays in honor of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias, vol. I, 
Dordrecht 1992, pp. 135-144, p. 138; McDougal M., International Law, Power and Policy: A 
Contemporary Conception, Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 82, 1953 –I, pp. 137-258, p. 256.
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in fact are the rules States and other subjects of international and EU law act 
in accordance with.5 
Taking in regard the growing differentiation of legal instruments in the EU 
and acknowledging polarity and interconnections of law and politics, it is my 
opinion that although none of the theories is perfect (binary view being to 
simplifi ed and straightforward, graduated view in certain aspects creating un-
practical puzzled reality) the theory of graduated normativity is the one more 
adequate to the reality of the legal system of the EU. The diversity in the EU 
is much greater than solely binding legal acts and non-binding political state-
ments. Both are indeed diametrically opposites, but claiming that everything 
that is binding is law, whereas which does not have such characteristic is solely 
politics or morality is unsuitable and inappropriate. Identically than in national 
legal orders also on the EU level different legal sources with different level 
of normative intensity exist. The key point is that normative strength of legal 
rules and principles shall not be treated strictly categorically as part of binary 
system, but rather normative infl uence shall be understood more fl owingly: 
from this point of view there are more levels and shades of normative infl uence 
and they often intermix and overlap. Different legal sources thus achieve di-
fferent levels of formality, argumentative powers and normative intensity. The 
conclusion is that soft law, despite its absence of formal legally binding force, 
nonetheless has certain normative value, creating special legal and not solely 
political effects. The most adequate defi nition of term soft law would therefore 
be that soft law are legal rules which despite the absence of legally binding 
force in strict sense may nonetheless produce and create practical as well as 
(indirect) legal effects, infl uencing actions of Member States, EU institutions 
and individuals.6 
Beside the question of nature of soft law instruments, issues relating to soft 
law are numerous (for example the question of indirect legal effect of soft law, 
question whether they actually contribute to the transparency, are they effi cient 
and on what ground, are they contrary to fundamental principles of the EU, 
especially principle of institutional balance etc.). The aim of this contribution 
is however to enlighten one of them: this is to demonstrate the evolving role 
of soft law in case law of the Court of the European Union (hereinafter: the 
Court).
5  Neuhold, H., The Inadequacy of Law-Making by International Law: “Soft Law” as an Al-
ternative? in Wolfrum, R. (ed.), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making, Berlin 
2005, pp. 39-52, p. 47. 
6  Similar defi nition is suggested also by Senden L., Soft Law in European Community Law, 
Hart Publishing, Oregon 2004, p. 110. 
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3.  SOFT LAW IN CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION – INITIAL IGNORANCE AND SUBSEQUENT 
OVERTURN OF UNDERSTANDING
Before looking at the case law of the Court it is necessary to stress that the atti-
tude of the Court towards the question of legal effects of legal acts is substan-
tive (instead of formal). Despite the fact that legal effects are most clearly 
created by binding legal acts, creating rights and constituting obligations for 
individuals (and thus have direct legal effect), the Court understands the con-
cept of legal effects in sensu lato. It acknowledges that non-bindingness of cer-
tain act does not automatically erode this act of legal effects in general: such 
act may nonetheless, through interpretation and in relation to other legal acts, 
create indirect legal effects and have indirect legal consequences.7
The analysis of early case law of the Court at the end of 1970-ies shows that in 
the past soft law was not devoted much attention: at the beginning the Court’s 
attitude towards existence of soft law was intensively restrictive, even ignorant. 
Although the parties in the cases before the Court often pleaded for soft law 
provisions to be considered when deriving a decision, the Court always overlo-
oked such instruments and adopted a decision solely on the ground of primary 
or secondary legislation of the EU. Soft law was disregarded as if it had not 
existed. This clearly derives from cases such as Cadillon v Höss,8 Béguelin9 
and Miller,10 which all dealt with the interpretation of fi rst paragraph of (now) 
Article 101 TFEU (before Article 81 of the Treaty). In all cases the parties 
presented arguments that by solving the dispute soft law rules included in De 
minimis Notice11 shall be considered. When adopting the decision however the 
Court did not mention soft law at all (not in the scope of presentation of argu-
ments of the parties nor in regard to existent legal framework) but solely gave 
an interpretation of Article 81 (then actually still Article 85) on the basis of 
de minimis rule included in respective provision of primary legislation itself.12 
7  Case C-322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v des maladies professionnelles [1989], ECR I-4407, 
paragraph 11. 
8  Case 1/71 Société anonyme Cadillon v Firma Höss, Maschinenbau KG, [1971] ECR 351.
9  Case 22/71 Béguelin Import Co. v S.A.G.L. Import Export, [1971] ECR 949. 
10  Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1978] ECR 131.
11  Commission’s Notice concerning Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices of Minor 
Importance which  do not fall under Article 85 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, OJ EU C 64, 1970, p. 1. Later this act was modifi ed in year 1977 (OJ EU C 
313, 1977, p. 3), year 1986 (OJ EU C 232, 1986, p.. 2) and year 1997 (OJ EU C 372, 1997, p. 13). 
12  Paragraph 12 of the judgement in case Cadillon v Höss, paragraphs 27-28 of the judgement 
in case Béguelin and paragraph 15 of the judgement in case Miller.
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Additionally also Advocate Generals were skeptical whether such Notice shall 
be used or not.13 
The same attitude derives from case law of the General Court as well. Al-
though for example plaintiffs pleaded for annulment of the decision of the 
European Commission with the argument that such decision is contrary to 
Commission’s Notice concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practi-
ces in the fi eld of cooperation between undertakings,14 the General Court still 
adopted its own interpretation of (then) Article 81 of the Treaty considering 
solely binding legislation and denying soft law even slightest recognition of 
existence.15 
However through evolution of case law Court’s attitude towards soft law has 
become more acceptable and is now mostly uniform. It seems that also the 
Court is not indifferent to rising trend of governance instead of government, 
appearing in last two decades, and increasing quantity of soft law in the EU: la-
test developments of case law show that Court is today not merely acknowled-
ging the existence of EU soft acts, but is also prepared to take these acts into 
account when deriving its decisions. With such understanding of nature and 
function of soft law informal legal effects are being recognized. What is more, 
in that way the Court is also acknowledging co-existence of traditional and 
“new” mode of regulation in the EU. With such acceptance the importance of 
soft law at the EU level has grown considerably. 
Analysis of case law shows that today there are two possible modes of consi-
deration of soft law in Court’s case law: fi rst, soft law is determined as part 
of legal framework, serving for adoption of interpretation of hard law or for 
confi rmation of interpretation of hard law provision, otherwise already reac-
hed on the basis of hard law. And second, to soft law (self-)binding effect is re-
cognized. It the scope of this approach soft law provisions are the substantive 
rules on which the ruling is actually grounded (Court’s decision is conditional 
to the soft law rule).
13  Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe in case Cadillon v Höss, presented on 04th May 
1971, p. 351, paragraph II; Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe in case Béguelin, presented 
on 28th October 1971, p. 949, paragraph II, Opinion of AG Warner in case Miller, presented on 
10th January 1978, p. 131 and subsequent, p. 157.  
14  OJ EU C 75, 1968, correction in OJ EU C 84, 1968, p. 14. 
15  Case T-310/94 Gruber + Weber GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1998] ECR II-1043, Case T-334/94 Sarrió SA v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1998] ECR II-1439, Case T-347/94 Mayr-Melnhof Kartongesellschaft mbH v Com-
mission of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-1751, Case T-354/94 Stora Kopparbergs 
Bergslags AB v Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-2111. 
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Most often the Court uses soft law as an instrument for confi rmation of in-
terpretation of hard law. In these situations the Court is acting in three steps: 
fi rstly it mentions soft law as part of legal framework (fi rst step), further it ac-
cepts an interpretation of binding legislation solely with consideration of pri-
mary and/or secondary legislation of the EU (second step) and then last but not 
least this interpretation is confi rmed by using soft law acts (with using words 
such as: “the same interpretation is confi rmed also in recommendation....” 
third step). This approach clearly follows from various case laws. Namely for 
example in cases Auer,16 Thieffry,17 Luisi and Carbone,18 Federal Republic 
of Germany and others v Commission of the European Communities19 the 
Court used sectoral general programs for confi rmation of the interpretation 
of binding law, whereas in cases Merkur,20 Dusseldorp,21 Hauer,22 and United 
Kingdom of Great Britain v Council23 resolution of the Council was used for 
confi rmation of the conclusion, already achieved on the basis of systemic in-
terpretation of resolution and/or directive. Also the General Court most often 
considers soft law instruments in the same manner.24  
Further, in less extensive but still uniform case law, soft law is used as actual 
basis for interpretation of hard law. It these situations hence soft law does not 
simply confi rm already accepted interpretation, but is the instrument on basis 
of which the interpretation of hard law is actually established. Consistent case 
16  Case 136/78 Criminal Proceedings against Vincent Auer [1979] ECR 437, paragraph 25.
17  Case 71/76 Jean Thieffry v Conseil de l’ordre des avocats à la cour de Paris [1977] ECR 
765, paragraph 14.
18  Joined cases 286/82 in 26/83 Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro 
[1984] ECR 377, paragraphs 11-15.
19  Joined cases 281/85, 283/85, 284/85, 285/85 and 287/85 Federal Republic of Germany and 
others v Commission of the European Communities [1987] ECR 3203, paragraphs 17 and 18. 
20  Case 43/72 Merkur Außenhandel-GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1973] ECR 1055, paragraphs 13 and 14. 
21  Case C-203/96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and others v Minister van Volk-
shuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075, paragraphs 30 and 
31.
22  Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, paragraph 15. 
23  Case 131/86 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the Eu-
ropean Communities [1988] ECR 905, paragraphs 26 and 27. 
24  See for example Case T-229/94 Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1997] ECR II-1689, paragraph 42 and Joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and 
T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS), Eurostar (UK) Ltd, ex European Passenger 
Services Ltd (EPS), Union internationale des chemins de fer (UIC), NV Nederlandse Spo-
orwegen (NS) and Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) v Commission of the 
European Communities [1998] ECR II-3141, paragraph 102.
INTEREULAWEAST Vol. I (1) 2014
152
law establishes that such approach is limited: it is true only when dealing with 
the declaration of the Council, accepted in the minutes of the meeting of the 
Council during which certain hard law was adopted. Only if such circum-
stances are given the Court will use declaration as ground for interpretation. 
Approach is the same when faced with joint declaration of the Council and 
other EU institution (for example European Commission). Stated rule clearly 
derives from the decision of the Court in already mentioned case Auer and 
cases Eagle,25 Antonissen26 and The Queen v The Licensing Authority27 and 
was confi rmed also in the latest case law.28 Reasons for such understanding are 
most likely to be searched in the fact that the Court wishes to interpret provi-
sions of legislation in the light of historical circumstances and development of 
certain legislative act and in the scope of this determine the objective legislator 
pursued when adopting legal rule.29 
In more detail it derives from case law that legal nature of consideration of 
mentioned declaration is twofold: when declaration of the Council, adopted 
in the minutes of the meeting on which regulation/directive was adopted ful-
fi ls additional criteria, established in case law, it serves for determination of 
subjective purpose of the Council on how to interpret certain rule. Case law 
established several conditions that have to be satisfi ed that this is the case. The 
most important prerequisite is express referencing in the wording of binding 
legislation on Council’s declaration.30 Other criteria that have to be met are: 1.) 
25  Case C-310/90 Nationale Raad van de Orde van Architecten v Ulrich Egle [1992] ECR 
I-177, paragraph 12. 
26  Case C-292/89 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Desiderius 
Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, paragraphs 17-18.
27  Case C-368/96 The Queen v The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 
(represented by The Medicines Control Agency), ex parte Generics (UK) Ltd, The Welcome 
Foundation Ltd and Glaxo Operations UK Ltd and others [1998] ECR 7967, paragraph 27.
28  Case C-329/95 VAG Sverige AB [1997] ECR 2675, paragraph 23; case C-25/94 Commission 
of the European Communities v Council of the European Union [1996] ECR I-1469, paragraph 
38; Case C-206/98 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [2000] 
ECR I-3509, paragraph 40; Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] 
ECR I-3793, paragraph 25; case C-402/03 Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka 
Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen [2006] ECR I-199, paragraph 
42; Case C-356/06 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister for the Environment, Ireland, Attorney 
General in Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) [2007] ECR I-3067, paragraph 31. 
29  Hartley T., Five forms of Uncertainty in European Community Law, Cambridge Law Jour-
nal, No. 55 (2), July 1996, pp. 265-285, p. 275. 
30  The rule was established in already case C-292/89 Antonissen, op. cit., paragraph 18, 
where the Court stated that: “such a declaration cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting 
a provision of secondary legislation where, as in this case, no reference is made to the content 
of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question. The declaration therefore has 
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that the declaration was made on the occasion of the adoption of a measure 
of secondary legislation which the Council has the power to adopt and that 
additionally the declaration is applicable only in the scope of this legislative 
act; 2.) that the declaration is not irreconcilable with legislative act and does 
not represent parallel legislation (its only purpose shall be in the explanation 
of legislative act and not fulfi llment of lacunae in the legislative provisions); 
3.) declaration cannot be the only reference but it must be used in conjunction 
with others, “in the sense that it can be verifi ed whether it confi rms the inter-
pretation ensuing in other respects from the tenor of the provisions in question 
and from their context”.31 If all criteria are satisfi ed then the declaration of 
the Council serves for determination of subjective purpose of the Council.32 
However when adopted legislative act is silent about the existence of the dec-
laration of the Council, adopted in the minutes of the meeting of the Council 
on which legislative act was adopted, then the declaration solely serves for 
determination of objective purpose (ratio) of legislative act (second approach, 
the rule was established in case The Queen v The Licensing Authority).33 This 
approach does not demand the satisfaction of any additional criteria. 
What is more, from the case The Queen v The Licensing Authority another 
similar use of soft law as ground for interpretation is evident; this time in 
regard to interpretative acts of the European Commission. In the respective 
decision the Court achieved the interpretation of the term “essentially similar 
medicinal product” with reference to guidelines of the European Commissi-
on, including the same defi nition, whereas the defi nition in binding law was 
not given. It emphasized that “the defi nition of that concept adopted in the 
minutes of the Council is, moreover, used in the guidelines published by the 
Commission.... According to the Annex to Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 
20 May 1975 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to 
analytical, pharmacotoxicological and clinical standards and protocols in 
respect of the testing of medicinal products (OJ 1975 L 147, p. 1), as amended 
by Commission Directive 91/507/EEC of 19 July 1991 (OJ 1991 L 270, p. 32), 
the particulars and documents accompanying an application for marketing 
no legal signifi cance.” The same was confi rmed in cases such as already mentioned Libertel, 
Skov and Bilka, Farrell, VAG Sverige and others. 
31  Opinion of AG Darmon in case Antonissen, presented on 8th November 1990, ECR I-745, 
paragraphs 23-27. Taking in regards all criteria AG Darmon concludes that declaration in case 
Antonissen presents parallel legislation that is why it cannot be taken into account by adoption 
of interpretation. 
32  At the time of the research of case law in eur-lex no cases, where Court would evaluate if 
these criteria are satisfi ed may be found. Namely in most cases the use of declaration is refused 
because of absence of express referencing in legislative act to the declaration.
33  Case C-368/96 The Queen v The Licensing Authority, op.cit., paragraph 27. 
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authorisation pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 65/65 are to be presented in 
a way which, inter alia, takes account of those rules [guidelines embodied in 
soft law]”34 From such understanding of the Court it is to be concluded that 
the Court as an instrument for giving interpretation takes into account also 
interpretative acts of the European Commission. Again prerequisite has to be 
met that express referencing of legislative act is given: in these cases the Court 
takes into account an interpretation included in soft law as a silent agreement 
of the legislator with the interpretation of the European Commission. Besides 
express referencing also in this case soft law has to be included in the minutes 
of the meeting of the Council on which the legislative act was adopted. When 
both criteria are fulfi lled the interpretation of the European Commission will 
be considered as part of substantive framework for interpretation of certain 
hard law provision.35 When express legislator’s reference is absent and inter-
pretative act of the European Commission includes an interpretation which 
in binding legislation is not given, the situation is contrary: soft act of the 
European Commission does not have legal effect – the Court denies the use of 
soft interpretation (by stating that “an unoffi cial interpretation of a regulation 
by an informal document of the Commission is not enough to confer to that 
interpretation an authentic Community [EU] character”) and in (accordance 
with its competence) adopts an interpretation on basis of hard law.36
Along with using soft law for interpretation of hard law or confi rmation of the 
latter, the Court is in certain specifi c situations also recognizing self-binding 
and binding effect of soft law - nature of soft provisions is in these cases deter-
mined as binding for EU institutions and Member States. Hence despite soft-
ness, to these provisions binding authority is conferred. Mentioned recognition 
of bindingness is typical for cases, relating to legal fi elds, characterized by 
wide discretion of certain EU institution for use and exercise of the EU law in 
individual situations (for example in the scope of state aid, competition or staff 
relating issues). In these legal fi elds EU institutions (acting alone or in accord 
with Member States) regularly adopt legal acts from which the declaration 
34  Paragraph 28. 
35  See also Case T-236/07 Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission [2010] 
ECR II-5253, paragraph 65 and Case C-545/11 Agrargenossenschaft Neuzelle eG v Landrat 
des Landkreises Oder-Spree [2013], not yet published, paragraph 52. 
36  Case 74/69 Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v Waren-Import-Gesellschaft Krohn & Co 
[1970] ECR. 451, paragraph 9; Case C-266/90 Franc Soba KG v Hauptzollamt Augsburg [1992] 
ECR 287, paragraph 19; Case C-309/94 Nissan France SA, Serda SA, Lyon Vaise Auto SARL, 
Garage Gambetta SA in Lyon Automobiles SA v Jean-Luc Dupasquier du Garage Sport Auto, 
Star’Terre SARL in Aqueducs Automobiles SARL [1996] ECR I-677, paragraph 22, Case 
C-545/11 Agrargenossenschaft Neuzelle eG v Landrat des Landkreises Oder-Spree [2013], not 
yet published, paragraph 52. 
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about the use of the EU law and the mode of exercise of discretion derives. 
The analysis of case law shows that these rules have self-binding effect on the 
adopting EU institution (fi rst approach; i.e. self-biding effect of soft rules) and 
that additionally also Member States must take these rules into account if the 
rules were adopted with their agreement (second approach; i.e. biding effect of 
soft law on the basis of an agreement).   
In regard to fi rst above mentioned approach, the review of practice and case 
law  show that if certain EU institution with wide discretion for adoption and 
exercise of law, has adopted its own rules, relating to use and mode of exercise 
of its discretion, such institution has bound itself with these rules: the Court 
repeatedly held that soft rules in this case have self-binding effect for the adop-
ting EU institution, therefore the latter is (generally) obliged to take account 
of these rules when adopting an individual decision. In the wording of the 
Court such understanding is in accordance with principle of equal treatment37 
and protection of legitimate expectations.38 Exceptionally the EU institution 
may still depart from those guidelines in an individual case if reasons that are 
compatible with the principle of equal treatment or protection of legitimate 
expectations are proven.39 
Other group of situations in which the Court is recognizing binding nature of 
soft law rules, are, as mentioned above, acts adopted in collaboration between 
the EU institution (mostly the European Commission) and Member States. In 
practice it is often that for the purpose of creating joint policy EU institutions 
and Member States adopt (soft) bilateral or multilateral agreements. As these 
acts are, in the understanding of the Court, “agreed” (also “negotiated”) acts 
37  Case 148/73 Raymond Louwage and Marie-Thérèse Marie-Thérèse Louwage, née Moria-
me, v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 81, paragraph 12; Case 25/83 
Adam Buick v Commission of the European Communities [1984], ECR 1773, paragraph 15; 
Case T-23/91 Henri Maurissen v Court of Auditors of the European Communities [1992] ECR 
II-2377, paragraph 42. 
38  Case 70/74 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Com-
munities [1975] ECR 795, paragraphs 18 and 20; Case 81/72 Commission of the European 
Communities v Council of the European Communities [1973] ECR 575, paragraph 13. 
39  See also Case 282/81 Salvatore Ragusa v Commission of the European Communities 
[1983] ECR 1245, paragraph 18; case 263/83 Mariette Turner v Commission of the European 
Communities [1985] ECR 893, paragraphs 20-21; Case T-380/94 Association Internationale 
des Utilisateurs de Fils de Filaments Artifi ciels et Synthétiques et de Soie naturelle (AIUF-
FASS) in Apparel, Knitting & Textiles Alliance (AKT) v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1996] ECR II-2169, paragraphs 56-57; Case C-409/00 Kingdom of Spain v Commis-
sion of the European Communities [2003] ECR I-1487, paragraph 73; Case T-154/2009 Manuli 
Rubber Industries SpA (MRI) v European Commission [2013] not yet published, paragraph 
115 and others. 
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(Member States and EU institution have agreed upon it), the rules constituted 
therein, despite their softness, are determined as binding. 
The acknowledgment of bindingness is however not automatic for all “agreed” 
acts: the Court has limited such recognition to two concrete spheres: the fi rst 
recognition of binding effect of (soft) “agreed” acts will be established when 
hard law expressly provides for adoption of such acts – hence for the Court to 
recognize binding effect of “agreed” act an express legal ground for adoption 
of this act has to be envisaged in binding legislation.40 A contrario it derives 
from the latter that “the fact that an act may have been adopted by mutual 
agreement is not capable of altering the legal position of the Member States, 
unless the possibility of adopting such a “negotiated” act was expressly pro-
vided for by a Community provision”41 The second situation when the Court 
establishes de facto binding effect of soft but negotiated rules is when in the 
EU special obligation of cooperation between the EU institution and Member 
States is established, “agreed” act being the result of such mutual coopera-
tion (this is the case for example in the area of state aid). The recognition of 
binding force of “agreed” acts is hence possible also in this case.42 Although 
the Court has not yet been confronted with this type of instruments outside 
the area of state aid and staff relating issues, taking in regard the explanations 
of the Court in mentioned cases, which were all given in broad terms and not 
limited to solely for example state aid, the conclusion is possible that the rule 
of recognition of binding effect of soft “agreed” rules under above mentioned 
conditions holds true for the EU legal order as whole. 
4.  CONCLUSION
From the analysis of case law of the Court it is clear that case law has evolved 
for initial ignorance of soft law to not solely recognition of its existence but 
also to the approval of its complementary role together with hard law. As the 
Court is regularly making use of soft instruments, to soft law normative status 
is conferred. The latter is not equal or “static” as normative level of hard law, 
40  Case 303/90 French Republic v Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR 
I-5315, paragraph 23; Case C-325/91 French Republic v Commission of the European Commu-
nities [1993] ECR 3283, paragraph 28. 
41  Opinion of AG Tesauro in case C-325/91, presented on the 16th December 1992, paragraph 
9. 
42  Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet Combinatie BV v Minister van Economische Zaken [1996] 
ECR I-5023, paragraph 13 and 14; Case T-354/05 Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) v Commis-
sion of the European Communities [2009] ECR II-471, paragraph 73; Case T-17/02 Fred Olsen, 
SA v Commission of the European Communities [2005], ECR II-2031, paragraph 164.
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but rather normative intensity varies depending from type of the act: when soft 
law is used “only” for confi rmation of already reached interpretation, the nor-
mative intensity is low; but when the Court determines binding effect of soft 
law, the normative value is much higher, actually de facto similar to normative 
intensity of binding EU legislation. Such undisputable acknowledgment of the 
dynamic nature of the term normative intensity by the Court confi rms the 
assumption of the theory of graduated normativity, in accordance with which 
there are more levels of normativity on the continuum scale between binding 
legislation and non-binding political statements as two extremes. 
With such recognition of collaboration and cooperation of soft and hard law, 
the Court is also recognizing that in the scope of the EU regulation soft and 
hard law do not necessarily exist one at the expense of the other, but are better 
working side by side (the question is therefore not soft law versus hard law, but 
soft law together with hard law).43 As soft law is rising in quantity as well as 
are in quantity growing cases in which the Court uses soft law, this unique cha-
racteristic of hybridity of regulation in the EU legal order will be even more 
crystallized in the future. Consequently to this it is therefore to presume that 
the relevance of the EU soft law will grow importantly, infl uencing legal rela-
tions between EU institutions and Member States and/or individuals, relying to 
such soft law provisions. Soft law is thus beside binding legislation gradually 
evolving into an increasingly important and constituent part of the EU law. 
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